




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TRENDS, BUOYANCY AND ELASTICITY OF THE  
CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Prepared by V. D. Lall

Econometric computations by J.V.M. Sarma



NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLICY  
12 RAJENDRA PLACE  
NEW DELHI

TRENDS, BUOYANCY AND ELASTICITY  
OF THE CORPORATE PROFITS TAX\*

I INTRODUCTION

The legal base of the corporate profits tax in India has remained unchanged for almost two decades. In the 1959-60 Budget a major change was introduced: the income tax on companies and the super tax were merged and the system of grossing up of shareholders' income abolished<sup>1/</sup>. Since then corporate profits tax changes have touched the statutory tax rate only twice; the other changes were mainly around fiscal concessions and incentives for fresh investments in the corporate sector, levies on capital gains, excess profits, and inter corporate investments. Total corporate profits have remained as the conceptual base of the tax. Yet the tax base has eroded over time, due to the increasing number of complicated fiscal concessions. The gap between the statutory and effective tax liabilities has become pronounced. No systematic

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\* Sujata Dutta collected most of the primary data.

<sup>1/</sup> Till this change was introduced, a shareholder was given credit for the tax deemed to have been paid by the company on dividends received by him. The grossing up system was highly complicated, and also introduced an element of uncertainty. The rate of grossing depended on the effective rate at which the company's profits were initially taxed, and this effective rate, in turn, was dependent upon the composition of the company's income. Further, when the dividends are paid from reserves, the determination of the effective rate at which profits are taxed become even more complicated. Finally, the shareholder's assessment could be made only after the company's assessment was completed. Under the new system of taxation, the shareholder's tax liability would no longer be related to the tax borne by the company. The company would deduct tax at a prescribed rate and credit it to the government and this tax would be reimbursed to the shareholders.

study has however been made to ascertain the sensitivity of the corporate profits tax system to changes in national income since the new system of company taxation was introduced in 1959-60. The present study is an attempt in this direction.

### 1. Objectives

The main objectives of this study are:

- i) to evaluate the trends in corporate profits tax revenue as well as the changing composition of assessed corporate income and tax yield obtained therefrom;
- ii) to measure the buoyancy and elasticity of the corporate profits tax system;
- iii) to identify some of the factors that explain the changes in elasticity of the corporate profits tax;

The present exercise is of an exploratory nature, and the results in some cases will need to be further substantiated. Certain areas wherein further research especially at the disaggregated level, need to be done, are identified.

In the light of the findings, some policy implications are spelt out relating to the elasticity of the corporate profits tax system, tax base erosion and fiscal concessions.

### 2. Period

The period covered in this study extends from 1960-61 to 1974-75 (1975-76 in some cases). This period begins after

the introduction of the revised company tax system in 1959-60; the last year chosen depends on the availability of data.

### 3. Data

The empirical exercises in this study are based on data obtained from the following sources:

- i) Directorate of Inspection, (Research, Statistics and Publication) Ministry of Finance - All India Income Tax Statistics. (Annual); hereinafter referred to as AIITS
- ii) Reserve Bank of India Bulletin - Studies on Company Finances.
- iii) Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India - National Accounts Statistics
- iv) Annual Budgets of the Central Government
- v) Annual Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, (Civil) Revenue Receipts. (Annual).

## II TRENDS IN CORPORATE PROFITS TAX REVENUE

The corporate profits tax occupies a significant position in the Indian tax system, contributing 11.3 per cent of the total tax revenue of the Government of India, 39.1 per cent of that which is accounted for by direct taxes and 40.4 per cent of the total income tax revenue in 1975-76. Over the years, its share in total tax revenue has slightly fallen from 12.3 per cent in 1960-61 to 11.3 per cent in 1975-76, though in terms of its share in total direct tax revenue it has increased markedly from 28.8 per cent in 1960-61 to 39.1 per cent in 1975-76. In absolute terms, the revenue from corporate profits tax has increased more than seven-fold,

from Rs. 109.70 crores in 1960-61 to Rs. 861.70 crores in 1975-76, and then to Rs. 1113.00 crores in 1976-77 (revised estimates).

It is expected to increase to Rs. 1298.20 crores in 1977-78. The share of corporate profits tax in direct tax as well as total tax revenue is expected to improve in 1976-77 and 1977-78. (Budget estimates). (Table II.1 and III.1).

The average annual growth of corporate profits tax revenue, as presented in Central Government Budgets has been 11.1 per cent during the period 1960-61 to 1975-76; the overall growth rate however conceals sharp year to year variations as well as inter period variations within the overall time period. Thus for instance, during the period 1960-61 to 1964-65 the average annual growth of corporate profits tax revenue was 30.2 per cent. The growth rate declined sharply to 2.1 per cent during 1965-66 to 1969-70 and then improved to 16.3 per cent during 1970-71 to 1974-75. (Table III.1)

#### 1. Composition of Assessed Corporate Income

Over the period covered in this study, there have been some noticeable changes in the composition of assessed corporate income and tax yield, reflecting the structural changes in the organised corporate sector. The data on assessed income and tax are taken from AIITS. There is, of course, some difference between the absolute amount of corporate tax yield presented for this analysis, compiled from AIITS and the corporate profits tax revenue data presented in the annual budgets of the Central Government. The difference arises because the Budget data relate mainly to advance payment of tax and collection of

arrears for earlier years; in effect, a large part of this consists of non assessed collections relating to the income in the same financial year. On the other hand, AIITS presents data on assessments completed during the year relating to the previous financial year and pending assessments of earlier years.

The most significant increase in assessed corporate income has been through corporate trading, manufacturing and service operations (i.e. "business and professions"). The share of this source rose from 83.7 per cent of the total assessed corporate income in 1960-61 to 88.6 per cent in 1971-72 and further to 90.0 per cent in 1975-76.

Assessed corporate income from investments has declined in importance over the period. Interest from securities and dividends on inter corporate investments jointly contributed 11.7 per cent of assessed corporate income in 1960-61, but only 5.4 per cent in 1975-76. The share of assessed income from property has declined nominally (from 1.0 per cent to 0.7 per cent) while that from profits on sale of capital assets i.e., capital gains, increased (from 0.4 per cent to 1.2 per cent).

The changing composition of assessed corporate income naturally changed the composition of corporate tax yield. Tax on business<sup>and</sup>/professional income contributed 89.8 per cent of the total corporate profits tax yield in 1975-76 as against

83.7 per cent in 1960-61, while corporate income from dividends and interest on Government securities together contribute 5.8 per cent of total tax yield now as against 11.9 per cent in 1960-61. (Table II.2)

2. Generation of Corporate Income:

Together with the structural changes in the composition of assessed corporate income there have been some marked changes in the industry-wise break-up of corporate assesseees and their income and tax yields. This analysis covers **only** corporate ~~income~~ income from business and professions (a source accounting for almost 90 per cent of assessed corporate income) and is therefore, limited to the extent that other corporate income ~~are~~ not included.

The changes in corporate income originating from different industry groups reveal the structural transformation that has taken place in the organised corporate sector. Corporate assesseees from engineering and chemical industries (20.2 per cent of total corporate assesseees) together account for 38.6 per cent of the assessed corporate income and 39.9 per cent of the tax yield in 1975-76, as against 21.3 per cent and 22.0 per cent respectively in 1960-61. Some other modern and developing industries like cement, rubber and paper (10.9 per cent of assesseees) contribute 11.2 per cent and 11.5 per cent of assessed corporate income and tax now as against 8.2 per cent in both ~~cases~~ in 1960-61. On the other hand, the share of traditional service group like commerce, transport and communications and

traditional and primary industries like textiles, leather, foodstuff and beverages, forestry, mining and quarrying has gone down in terms of <sup>number of</sup> corporate assesseees, income and tax. These groups of assesseees together accounted for ~~52.5~~ per cent of assesseees, ~~49.2~~ per cent of assessed corporate income and ~~46.9~~ per cent of tax yield in 1960-61, but ~~55.2~~ per cent, ~~34.9~~ per cent and ~~35.8~~ per cent respectively in 1975-76. Among these groups, the proportion of corporate assesseees from commerce, transport and communications has improved (from 34.8 per cent to 37.1 per cent) but their proportionate contribution to assessed corporate income and tax has declined quite sharply (from 21.8 per cent to 13.2 per cent for income and from 22.8 per cent to 14.2 per cent for tax yield). (Table II.3)

These trends relating to both the private as well as the public sector corporate assesseees, correspond to the general diversification that took place in the industrial sector biased towards relatively modern and capital intensive industries. Capital intensive modern industries are becoming more important sources of corporate income and tax yield while traditional industries and the services sector in the organised corporate sector are declining in importance as a source of corporate tax revenue, even though the number of assesseees from these sectors has increased over time. This finding has significant implications for the administration of the corporate profits tax.

### 3. High Concentration among Assesseees

Another interesting revelation from the data on corporate assesseees and their assessed income and tax yield (relating only to income from business and professions) is that the majority of corporate assesseees are still relatively small having annual assessed income not exceeding Rs.50,000. Almost 60 per cent of corporate assesseees fall in this category, with 45.2 per cent of the assesseees having income not exceeding Rs.25,000. Yet, their combined contribution to assessed corporate income and tax is negligible (1.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively). Not only do the small and medium sized corporate assesseees contribute insignificantly to tax revenue, but their relative share has also deteriorated: in 1960-61 they together accounted for 68.6 per cent of total corporate assesseees, 3.3 per cent of assessed corporate income and 3.3 per cent of corporate tax yield as against 57.4 per cent, 1.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively, in 1975-76. On the other hand, slightly more than 30 per cent of corporate assesseees with an annual assessed income of Rs.1 lakh or more contribute as much 97.3 per cent of assessed corporate income and 97.1 per cent of the tax yield. If further break-up of large corporate assesseees can be obtained (say, into those having annual assessed corporate income between Rs.10 lakh and Rs.25 lakh and those with annual assessed corporate income above Rs.25 lakh ) it would probably turn out that the degree of concentration of assessed corporate income and tax

is even more pronounced. Even for the presently available size wise distribution of corporate assesseees, the Gini coefficient for 1975-76 is as high as 0.835 and 0.832 for assessed corporate income and tax yield, respectively. (Tables II.4 and II.5)

The high Gini coefficients, with less than 4,000 corporate assesseees accounting for almost the entire assessed corporate income and tax yield, besides reflecting the high level of concentration prevailing in the Indian corporate sector, are highly significant from the view point of corporate profits tax administration.

#### 4. Pending Assessments

The number of pending assessments of corporate assesseees is quite large. As at the end of March 1975, as many as 28,438 corporate assessments are pending, of which more than one-tenths are pending for three years or more and about two-fifths for two years or more. These proportions have remained fairly constant during the last three years (1973 to 1975) for which some data are available; the bulk (three fifths) of the pending assessments are for only one year. One cannot of course say anything definite about the amount of corporate income assessed and corporate tax collected from these pending cases. It is, however, likely that the amount of corporate income to be assessed and tax obtained from the pending assessments may be quite large as it is unlikely that the larger proportion of the pending assessments

would relate to small assesseees; as shown earlier in this section, *only about* three-tenths of corporate assesseees have assessed income of Rs.1 lakh or more and they together account for almost the entire assessed corporate income and corporate profits tax yield. (Table II.6)

### III ELASTICITY AND BUOYANCY

The analysis in Section II brought out the high degree of concentration of assessed corporate income and tax yield in a small proportion of corporate assesseees, as well as indicated the trend for an increasing proportion of corporate income and corporate profits tax arising from the modern capital intensive areas in the corporate sector, which received marked impetus during the sixties. The Indian Companies Act as well as the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, encouraged the formation of corporate units, particularly in capital intensive and modern industries and this is reflected in the changing pattern of origin of assessed corporate income and tax. In this direction, fiscal incentives also played <sup>an</sup> important role. A number of fiscal measures were introduced during the period and the scope of the existing ones were further enlarged to encourage fresh investments in desired "priority" industries. The fiscal concessions based on fresh investments in plant and machinery include the development rebate or investment allowance, tax holiday, accelerated depreciation and special deductions for export

income. These concessions gave an impetus to investment activity in the preferred areas because they significantly reduced the ~~effective~~ corporate tax liability. In a sense the base of the corporate profits tax system, which has always been corporate profits, was eroded. Estimates of the actual impact of these concessions on effective tax liability, or on the growth of the corporate sector have not been made. Some work relating to development rebate was done in 1967 (Lall, 1967). Even work on the responsiveness of the overall corporate profits tax system to national income is scanty, the only work available so far being that of G.S. Sahota (Sahota, 1967). An analysis of Sahota's findings precedes our own estimates and analysis of the elasticity and buoyancy of the corporate profits tax system.

#### 1. Sahota's Estimates

The degree of responsiveness or sensitivity of the corporate profits tax structure to changes in national income is reflected in its elasticity and buoyancy coefficients.<sup>2/</sup>

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<sup>2/</sup> The terms "buoyancy" and "elasticity" have been explained in detail in the Institute's companion paper on "Trends, Composition and Elasticity of Union Excises and Import Duties" by P.B. Nayak and K.K. Atri. Briefly, the measure of buoyancy shows the percentage change in the actual yield of the tax for a one per cent change in national income or other relevant base, while the elasticity coefficient gives the percentage automatic change in the yield of the tax in response to a one per cent change in national income or the relevant base.

Sahota's estimates made in 1961 relate to the period 1951-52 to 1957-58. The coefficients were found to be quite high, the elasticity coefficient being 1.25 and the buoyancy coefficient 1.47. These values indicated a highly elastic and buoyant corporate profits tax structure.

Sahota, however, did not indicate what data he used to compute these coefficients. During the period which he has covered, only the <sup>per</sup> surtax was shown as corporation tax while the income tax on companies was shown under the general category "income tax". Apparently he has included both the <sup>per</sup> surtax and the income tax on companies, the breakup of which is available in the explanatory memorandum to the budgets, because our own computation using such data gives a fairly similar result, the elasticity coefficient being 1.19.

Sahota did not examine the factors that resulted in the corporate profits tax system being highly elastic; an explanation is now attempted. During the period which Sahota covered, the variation between the statutory corporate profits tax rate and the effective tax rate was negligible as the various concessions which erode the taxable base did not then exist. Thus, while the statutory tax rate for public limited companies was 45.0 per cent, the average effective tax rate was 44.1 per cent. Similarly, the average statutory and effective tax rates for private limited companies for a part of the period (1955-56 to 1957-58) for which comparable effective

tax rate data are available, was 60 per cent and 56.2 per cent, respectively. Therefore, increases in corporate profits tax as a result of increases in turnover and output of the corporate sector were reflected in the tax paid by it.

Hypothetically, therefore, it could be expected that tax paid by the corporate sector increased in consonance with the increase in corporate profits, and at the same rate, as the corporate profits tax is a proportional tax. And, as the national income as well as the corporate profits in the industrial sector (a close approximation to the corporate sector) grows at a faster rate than that in other sectors, the elasticity of the corporate profits tax to national income was higher than unity.<sup>3/</sup>

## 2. Our Estimates<sup>4/</sup>

Over a period of years, the corporate profits tax structure in India seems to have become less responsive to changes in

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<sup>3/</sup> In general, it may be added that if the rates of tax are not essentially regressive or progressive i.e. are proportional, over the ranges of income, the elasticity of tax yield to tax base cannot but be expected to deviate significantly from 1. If the overall elasticity deviates from 1, it can be explained only by the elasticity of tax base to national income. If the overall elasticity is greater than 1, then the elasticity of tax base to national income is greater than 1, that is, tax base is growing at a faster rate than national income. If, however, the overall elasticity is less than 1, then the elasticity of tax base to national income is less than 1, that is, the tax base is growing at a slower rate than national income.

<sup>4/</sup> The proportional adjustment method is used to clean the series of the effects of discretionary changes for computing the elasticity coefficient.

national income. While Sahota's estimates for the period 1951-52 to 1957-58 indicated a highly elastic and buoyant corporate profits tax structure, our computations for a later and substantially longer period from 1960-61 to 1974-75 indicate that the corporate profits tax structure during this period was highly inelastic and also that the revenue collection did not keep pace with the growth in national income. Over this 15 year time period, the elasticity coefficient works out to 0.74 and the buoyancy coefficient to 0.96<sup>5/</sup>. In other words, for every increase in national income of 1 per cent, corporate tax revenue increased by only 0.96 per cent and would have increased by only 0.74 per cent in the absence of discretionary tax changes. (Table III-2)

### 3. Changing Economic Conditions and Elasticity Coefficients

The period 1960-61 to 1974-75 can be broken up into three distinct sub-periods on the basis of the different economic conditions prevailing in these periods. During the years 1960-61 to 1964-65 (period I) there was an all-round growth in the corporate sector, also marked by improvements in output, sales and profits. The period 1965-66 to 1969-70 (period II) includes three years 1967-68 to 1969-70 which were marked by industrial recession, generated by inadequate demand culminating in a set-back in corporate expansion, output, sales and profits. The average rate of expansion during the

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<sup>5/</sup>  $R^2$  being 0.84 and 0.86 respectively.

period was therefore low, though the slightly better performance during the first two years of this period, as seen from Table III.3, to some extent marginally altered the otherwise depressing periodwise results. The following period 1970-71 to 1974-75 (period III) was an era of slow recovery coupled with a very high rate of inflation; to some extent, improvements in financial results during this period are, therefore, illusory but elasticity coefficients do take these things into consideration as they link tax at current prices with national income at current prices.

Table III.4 presents growth-rate data for selected indicators of changes in the private corporate sector, worked only on the basis of RBI data. These substantiate the distinct differences brought out in the preceding paragraph as between the three time periods. Gross fixed assets per company showed an average annual increase of 10.0 per cent in period I, 9.2 per cent in period II and 9.3 per cent in period III, while total corporate assets had an average annual growth of 8.7 per cent, 8.1 per cent and 8.2 per cent respectively; the growth rates of profits before tax and value of production also follow a similar trend. These data <sup>thus</sup> show that there was a distinct set back in period II and the recovery though definite in period III, was not complete.

The sharp variations in corporate performances within the 15 years time period can explain the overall low elasticity

of the corporate profits tax to changes in national income. The 5 year sub-periods are however too short to do any meaningful regression analysis. Simple year to year elasticities can however be computed. Before the year to year elasticity results are presented, some revealing comparable growth rate data on corporate profits, value of production and corporate profits tax provision for the RBI sample companies as well as of national income are examined.

The average annual growth of corporate profits tax provisions during period I was at 16.8 per cent, substantially higher than the average annual growth of corporate profits (9.0 per cent), value of production (9.7 per cent) and national income (11.2 per cent). On the other hand, during period II, corporate profits tax provision declined at an average annual rate of 0.2 per cent, while national income averaged an annual growth of 10.8 per cent. Finally, during period III, the respective average annual growth rates were 14.6 per cent for national income and 2.5 per cent for corporate profits tax provisions. (Table III.4)

Using the data on company finances available in the RBI studies, and a simple method to measure the year to year elasticity of the corporate profits tax provision (X) to national income (Y) within the 3 sub periods and working out period averages gives results which are in harmony with the period-wise results of corporate operations.<sup>6/</sup> In period I,

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<sup>6/</sup> The following formula is used to compute the elasticity coefficient of X (corporate tax provision) to Y (national income)

$$E = \frac{\Delta X}{\Delta Y} \cdot \frac{Y}{X}$$

elasticity was very high (2.58), it slumped sharply in period II (0.10), and partially recovered in period III (1.21). (Table III. The less than unit elasticity for the whole period, 1960-61 to 1974-75 can, therefore, be attributable to the unusually low coefficients for the years 1965-66 to 1969-70. These results have limitations because company tax provisions in the balance sheets are mere provisions and are not exactly what are later shown in AIITS as well as in the Budgets as corporate profits tax assessments and collections. Further, the RBI data on company finances relate to sample of companies, whose size and composition vary from time to time. Yet in the absence of other more appropriate data, these results are useful.

#### 4. Dummy Variable

To capture the periodic changes within the abnormal sub-period, 1965-66 to 1969-70 which includes the years of industrial recession, a dummy variable was used and the relationship between the corporate profits tax to national income improved. While the elasticity coefficient improved from 0.74 to 0.80, the buoyancy coefficient remained unaffected at 0.96<sup>2/</sup>. The use of a dummy variable therefore improves the elasticity of the corporate profits tax system.

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<sup>2/</sup>  $R^2$  being 0.88 and 0.87 respectively. Dummy variable is statistically significant at 5 per cent probability level

## 5. Some Alternative Estimates

Elasticity and buoyancy coefficients are also worked out for the period 1960-61 to 1974-75 (up to 1975-76 in 3 cases) with alternative definitions of national income and using the regression approach. These include gross national product and net domestic product at factor cost and market value and net national product at factor cost. The elasticity coefficients derived are very similar, ranging between 0.738 and 0.751. The range of variation of the buoyancy coefficients for the different period is somewhat longer, namely between 0.901 and 0.982. (Table III.6)

As the bulk of the corporate profits tax revenue originates from corporate entities engaged in non-agricultural operations, the elasticity and buoyancy coefficients were computed with gross domestic product and net domestic product as bases excluding income from agriculture and allied sectors as well as from community and personnel services sectors. The adjustments do not affect the values of the coefficients; elasticity and buoyancy coefficients with adjusted GDP works out to 0.75 and 0.96 and with adjusted NDP as base, these are 0.68 and 0.89 respectively.

## 6. Disaggregated Results

In order to further examine the inelastic corporate profits tax structure, it was felt that calculations may be done at the disaggregated level, to get a picture of the buoyancy of the corporate profits tax for different types of

companies. Under the existing system, the statutory tax rate for public limited widely held companies is 55 per cent, for private limited companies 65 per cent and for foreign companies 70 per cent. Further, the effective tax rate which determines the elasticity show even greater variation depending on the type of industries in which the companies operate, the location of the industries, the expansion and investment programmes and the export performances. Tax data however, is not available in the annual budgets for different categories of companies having different statutory and effective tax liabilities. The AITTS publishes data on public limited, private limited and foreign companies on the basis of assessed tax collected in a particular year and which includes collections made for earlier years; hence such data cannot be used to compute the elasticity coefficients by type of companies.

Some information, which can be used is available in the RBI studies on company finances. Such data, though suffering from certain limitation, indicated earlier,<sup>8/</sup> do enable us to have some idea of the buoyancy of corporate profits tax provision (per RBI sample company) to national income at the disaggregated level. A set of buoyancy coefficients for public limited companies,<sup>e</sup> private limited companies and foreign companies are therefore computed.

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<sup>8/</sup> The limitations are spelt out earlier in sub-section 3 page 17

While for public and private limited companies the period covered is 1960-61 to 1974-75, for foreign companies it is 1960-61 to 1972-73.

The buoyancy coefficients bring out an important result; the buoyancy of large public limited Indian companies is higher than that of large foreign companies which have a higher statutory tax rate. In the case of large and medium sized public limited companies, buoyancy of tax provision to NNP at market prices during 1960-61 to 1974-75 is 0.73<sup>9/</sup> while that of tax provision to the gross value added by the companies is 0.81<sup>9/</sup>; the respective buoyancy coefficients of foreign companies for the period 1960-61 to 1972-73 are 0.48<sup>10/</sup> and 0.77<sup>9/</sup>. In the case of large and medium sized private limited companies the buoyancy coefficient are -0.01<sup>10/</sup> with reference to NNP and 0.60<sup>10/</sup> with reference to GVA.

(Table III.7) These results, though not statistically significant in all cases, suggest among various possibilities a slower growth rate of foreign companies vis a vis large Indian companies and national income.

Variation in statutory tax rate thus has some bearing on the effective tax rate and also an impact on the buoyancy of the corporate profits tax.

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9/ Statistically significant at 5 per cent level

10/ Statistically not significant at 5 per cent level.

#### IV. DETERMINANTS OF ELASTICITY: SOME POSSIBILITIES

Theoretically, various factors, closely interlinked to each other, have a bearing on the sensitivity or responsiveness of the corporate profits tax structure, in India as well as elsewhere. Some of these factors are now identified. The analysis is not wholly and only applicable to the Indian situation, but is rather <sup>of</sup> a general nature.

As the elasticity of the corporate profits tax to national income is a product of the elasticity of tax yield with respect to tax base and the elasticity of tax base with respect to national income, factors affecting both these components need to be examined. If the ratio of tax yield to tax base rises over time, the elasticity of the tax yield with respect to tax base will be greater than 1 and when the above ratio falls over time the elasticity will be less than 1. However, under a proportional tax system, the ratio of tax yield to tax base will remain constant and the elasticity of tax yield with respect to tax base will be equal to 1. The elasticity of tax yield with respect to national income will then depend upon the elasticity of tax base with respect to national income only.

For a given set of concessions under proportional taxation, if the ratio of tax base to national income decreases over time, the elasticity of the tax base with respect to national income and hence, the elasticity of tax yield with respect to national income will be less than 1. In case

336.243  
LIST.

13503  
17.12.87

the type of concessions also change over time the tax structure can be deemed to have changed. The ratio of the relative change in tax yield to the relative change in national income will then give the buoyancy rather than the elasticity of the tax structure.

1. Erosion of Taxable Profits Base

The following analysis first relates to the erosion of the taxable profits base, examining the factors that affect the elasticity of tax base to national income, by widening the gap between corporate profits and taxable corporate profits, the gap being due to fiscal concession linked adjustments. The faster the growth of fiscal concessions, the lower will be the growth of the taxable profits base vis a vis total corporate profits base. In effect, the variation in the growth rate of the two profits bases affects the elasticity of the corporate profits tax structure.

a. Fiscal concessions: The multitude of fiscal concessions result in some proportion of corporate generated income and profits not paying the corporate profits tax, or not paying the full quantum of the corporate profits tax which would have had to be paid in the absence of the concessions. The fiscal concessions give a direct impetus to the expansion of the corporate sector, both through expansion of existing units as well as through setting up of new units. Not only do the number of fiscal concessions increase over time, but

the number of corporate bodies taking advantage of the various concessions are also simultaneously on the increase.

The substantial growth in the number of corporate units and in the total profits of these, will tend to raise the elasticity of tax yield with respect to national income. But the increasing erosion of the tax base, even if the number of concessions do not change, will dampen the elasticity and tend to keep it at a low level.

b. **Priority sectors:** Further, in a developing economy the industrial structure undergoes perceptible changes, as brought out in Section II. One point that needs to be pointed out here is that certain sectors are specified for "priority" treatment for purposes of fiscal incentives, lower tax rates, financial assistance, supply of raw materials, power, fuel and other infrastructural requirements. These sectors therefore, receive an even greater impetus than sectors not considered as "priority". Consequently, these sectors expand at a faster rate than other sectors and at the same time their income and profits are liable for corporate profits taxation at lower rates or are completely exempt from the purview of the corporate profits tax for specified periods.

The above factors which result in the changes in the ratio of taxable corporate profits to corporate profits over time lead to changes in the elasticity of the corporate profits tax. If the ratio improves, elasticity will improve

and if the ratio decreases elasticity will decrease. Further, even if the share of corporate profits in national income remains unchanged, but the ratio changes, elasticity will change. The elasticity would rise or fall depending on the change in the ratio. Similarly, even if the share of corporate profits in national income falls, the ratio of taxable corporate profits to corporate profits may rise and neutralise the adverse effect on elasticity.

## 2. Erosion of Total Corporate Profits Base

There are certain conditions under which the corporate profits base (unadjusted for fiscal concessions) can also change even before the fiscal concessions can operate; in fact these concessions can come into operation after an earlier set of factors have already, to an extent reduced the corporate profits base. The effect is directly through changes in the rate of profitability and the growth rate of corporate profits.

a. Capacity utilisation, production cost and profits: The availability of various fiscal concessions linked to fresh investments in priority sectors, backward areas as well as in general industrial operations induce corporate units to add to their fixed assets to obtain these concessions and reduce their effective tax liability; at times there may be a fall in corporate profits in the process. In some other cases, even without fiscal concessions new investments are

forthcoming for other reasons and these could also affect corporate profits. Theoretically, a situation could arise under which additional fixed assets are not fully or adequately utilised, with the result that while there is an increase in fixed costs represented by such items as interest on borrowings to finance the expansion programme, repair and maintenance, cost of basic infrastructural facilities, salaries of essential personnel for the additional assets, among others, there is no corresponding growth in output through full utilisation of the additional assets to pay for the additional fixed and operating cost incurred on them. As a result, income generated from this as well as other operations and departments are used to meet the cost of maintaining the new fixed assets, leading to a decline in the overall corporate profits and also tax liability. These developments even erode the corporate profits tax base even as regards the profits and output from the already existing assets. Thus, while additions to the national income through the corporate entities continues to grow or is at least, the same as before, there is an absolute decline in tax accruing from those operations because of the erosion of the tax base due to higher per unit cost of production.

Partial utilisation of newly created capacity naturally has an adverse effect on profits, even though the tax saved because of the reduction in tax liability linked to the additional investment may be greater than the loss due to the

fall in profitability due to lower aggregate capacity utilisation. There could also be—even though it may appear somewhat irrational—a possibility of corporate units using tax concessions to reduce the tax liability in spite of a set back in their profits. It has been found that industries add to their fixed assets, for various reasons, such as to avail of fiscal concessions, to pre-empt licensable capacity and/or strengthen monopolistic control over industries even if there is an immediate set back in short term profitability.

b. Corporate growth, losses and carry forwards: In a developing economy, organised business operations tend to increase and business concerns operate as corporate entities mainly because they receive various facilities and privileges not available to other forms of business organisations such as sole proprietorship concerns, registered partnerships and other firms. Existing as well as new entrepreneurs prefer to operate as corporate entities, either by setting up new companies and/or converting existing non-corporate firms into corporate entities. In particular, the benefits of limited liability, lower statutory tax rate on undistributed profits, easier access to credit facilities, among others, induce the growth of the corporate sector. However, a large number of corporate units are necessarily small in size and these, as well as large companies which are of recent origin do not generally earn enough income to be taxable under the corporate

profits tax system, or may even make losses which can be carried forward. This fact creates a situation in which not the whole income and profits generated in the corporate sector become liable for corporate profits taxation. As a result, while the rate of growth of the contribution by the corporate sector to national income may increase, the rate of growth of tax revenue contributed by the corporate sector may not increase proportionately. This is a special characteristic of a growing organised sector in all countries.

c. Concentration, recession and boom: As a result of various factors, some inherent in the system itself, a few giant-sized companies tend to account for a sizable proportion of assessed capital, income, profits and tax payments in major industrial sectors. Any significant change in the operations of even of a few of them has an immediate impact on the whole sector and even on the economy, be it in terms of production, employment, profits or tax revenue. The impact becomes highly pronounced during a period of recessionary whirlpool or a phase of booming economic conditions. Thus, for example, during a recessionary situation the growth rate of national income would be higher than that of corporate profits tax revenue because the production process cannot be immediately stopped and the corporate output produced is accounted for in national income calculations, but the demand based recession results in a slump which is reflected in increasing inventory holdings,

lower sales, profits and tax liabilities. Therefore, tax revenue has a tendency to fall faster than the fall in corporate sector contribution to national income or national income itself. On the other hand, during "boom" production cannot be immediately increased in response to demand pressures (even if prices may rise), due to various constraints like existing capacity, availability of basic inputs (raw materials, labour, power and fuel) and finances; recourse is made to inventory holdings to meet the surging demands. As inventory is already accounted for in the national income data at some earlier point of time, but is not reflected in profits and tax liability until sales are realised, there is a possibility of profits and tax liability increasing at a faster rate during a 'boom' than the value added by the corporate sector or national income itself.

In other words, while during a recession there is a tendency for the growth in corporate profits and tax to fall more sharply than the growth in the national income, during boom, there is a tendency for corporate profits and tax to increase faster than national income. The variations are thus analogous to those of a "fix price" system in which imbalances lead to changes in the volume of inventories, and thereby affecting the elasticity of the corporate profits tax structure.

d. Assessment delays. Delays in tax assessment and determination of tax liability is another possible factor. The corporate sector's contribution to the national product is already accounted for, once the output leaves the factories; in fact, other taxes like excise duties, sales tax, octroi, personal income tax on salaries of employees may already have been paid. Yet it is possible that the corporate profits tax revenue - or, at least, a part of it - accruing on the output and profits already accounted for in the national income calculations is not yet determined or collected, and is therefore not reflected in the data on corporate profits tax revenue. While data on extent of delays in tax assessment and arrears in tax collection are not available, theoretically, the time lag between the accounting of corporate output and profits in the national income data and the accounting of the assessed corporate profits tax in the tax revenue statistics adds to the inelasticity of the corporate profits tax system at any particular point of time, assuming that the amount of arrears increase proportionately.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

### 1. Need for Higher Sensitivity

To the extent that the sensitivity of a tax structure is considered to be an indicator of a healthy system, there is need to improve the elasticity of the corporate profits tax in India. This is all the more necessary in the context of further growth in the operations of the corporate sector expected in the future, inspite of greater emphasis being

given to rural and small scale industries. It is not unlikely that over the coming years, a substantial proportion of small scale industries as well as rural industries will operate as corporate units, due to the various fiscal and other benefits that a corporate entity is eligible for, vis a vis other forms of business organisation. The existing units also can be expected to grow. There is therefore urgent need to look into ways of improving the elasticity of the corporate profits tax system so that revenue resources can be easily and painlessly mobilised from this sector.

## 2. Fiscal Concessions and the Erosion in Tax Base

As it emerges from this study, the investment based concessions erode the tax base, and the erosion can become more substantial when the additional fixed assets fail to be adequately utilised. There is therefore need to re-examine the present system of corporate profits tax concessions and look into the possibilities of linking corporate profits tax concessions with other criteria like improvement in production, employment and capacity utilisation, apart from fresh investment. Measurement of capacity utilisation, of improvement in production and productivity as well as of employment generation, does raise basic methodological problems, but these need to be resolved in one way or another.

## 3. Need for Overall study of all Taxes

There is need to make <sup>a</sup>comprehensive and simultaneous study of the elasticity and buoyancy of all taxes, rather

than study individual taxes in isolation. Even if the elasticity coefficient of a particular tax, such as the corporate profits tax is low that by itself need not be a matter for serious concern. The elasticity of other taxes which are dependent to a large extent on the growth and performance of the corporate sector need to be examined. As explained earlier in this paper, corporate profits tax liability accrues only when proceeds of sales are received and profits worked out. However, much before this stage arises, the growth and operations in the corporate sector gives rise to various other tax liabilities and these taxes are already paid. Growth in fixed assets involves payment of import duty on imported capital goods and excise duties, sales tax and octroi on domestic capital goods, import duty on imported raw materials and excise duties, sales taxes and octroi on purchases of domestic raw materials and other inputs. Sales tax and octroi are also paid on sale<sup>and</sup> transportation of the finished goods, such ----- before profits can be earned. Finally, personal income tax is paid on income received by individuals and firms involved in the series of exchange processes.

The built up of fixed assets, inventory and sales thus involves a process of exchanges during which various commodity and personal taxes are levied and paid at the Central and State levels. Therefore, a faster growth in the corporate sector could improve the elasticity of various Central and States taxes, but until the products are actually

sold and profits made, there is no positive effect on the elasticity of the corporate profits tax system. Therefore, while there is need to think in terms of introducing measures which can reduce the erosion in the tax base of the corporate profits tax, there is no need to get alarmed, at the low elasticity of the corporate profits tax.

In fact, it can be said that in a developing economy which is posed for growth there would be a tendency for the corporate profits tax to have an elasticity less than unity, while other taxes which are paid by the growing corporate sector may have relatively higher elasticity coefficients. On the other hand, it is possible, that even though the growth rate of profits is <sup>just</sup> maintained but the growth rate of the corporate sector capacity is not high enough to bring into operation the fiscal concessions that erode the taxable profits base, the elasticity coefficient of the corporate profits tax may be high.

#### 4. Tax Administration

There is need to improve the tax administration system to reduce the delays in assessment and collection of the corporate profits tax. The very high proportion of corporate income and tax accounted for by an infinitesimally small proportion of assessees highlights the necessity for placing more emphasis on large assessees and fixing a suitable officer: assessee ratio for these cases, taking into consideration their geographical and zonal distribution.

5. Data Gaps

Lack of adequate data needs to be bridged to enable a continuous and reasonably early evaluation of the corporate profits tax system. In particular, studies on the impact of the various concessions and rebates which affect tax base and elasticity, and a full and periodic assessment of the sensitivity of the tax system would then be possible.

6. Areas for Research

Various areas wherein there is a need for further research in the field of corporate profits taxation have emerged from the present study. There is need for quantification of the major tax concessions to assess their actual impact and effect on savings, investment, capital structure, production, employment and capacity utilisation as well as on effective tax liability. It has also to be seen to what extent fiscal concessions have actually served the purposes they were intended to serve. Only on the basis of such a detailed enquiry can one draw conclusions regarding the type of concessions that should be provided on a long-term basis.

7. International Comparisons

In other countries also, fiscal concessions are special features of corporate profits tax systems. A comparative study of these tax systems and that of India, together with a quantification of the effect of their incentive provisions would be helpful in reformulating the incentives

and concessions in our own country.

A long-term study undertaken in the Institute would attempt to go into some of these aspects of the corporate profits tax system, including among other things, fiscal concessions, legal statutes, and quantification of the impact of the tax structure. The present exercise is a preliminary one covering only one aspect of this research project. The Institute would be very happy to receive comments and suggestions emanating from the methodology covered in this study, and the results obtained therefrom, as well as on other aspects that could and should be covered in a comprehensive study of corporate profits taxation in India.

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TABLE II.1

Trends in Corporate Profits Tax Revenue

Year	Corporate Profits Tax Revenue (Rs. Crore)	Share of Corporate Profits Tax in Total Tax Revenue (Per cent) <sup>1/</sup>	Share of Corporate Profits Tax in Total Direct Tax Revenue (Per cent) <sup>2/</sup>	Share of Corporate Profits Tax in Total Income Tax Revenue (Per cent) <sup>3/</sup>
1960-61	109.10	12.25	28.80	29.98
1965-66	304.04	14.79	41.89	43.54
1970-71	370.52	11.55	30.01	30.80
1975-76	861.70	11.33	39.08	40.37
1976-77 <sup>4/</sup>	1113.00	13.77	49.62	51.34
1977-78 <sup>5/</sup>	1298.20	14.42	51.79	53.31

1/ Consists of tax revenues ~~for~~ direct and indirect taxes, including States' shares of taxes which are collected by the Centre but shared with the States.

2/ Includes taxes on income, estate duty, wealth tax, gift tax including states' share in them.

3/ Includes taxes on personal and corporate income, including States' share in them.

4/ Revised estimates.

5/ Budget estimates

Source: Central Government Budgets.

TABLE - II.2

Sources of Assessed Corporate Income and Tax Yield

Source of Income	1960-61			1965-66		
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax Yield (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax Yield (Rs. lakh)
1. Interest on securities	1585 (10.30)	791.9 (3.07)	581.2 (3.06)	1187 (6.77)	666.6 (1.69)	326.5 (1.72)
2. Property income	1360 (8.84)	248.0 (0.96)	189.3 (1.00)	1232 (7.03)	725.5 (1.84)	412.0 (2.17)
3. Business and professions	8280 (53.82)	21596.0 (83.65)	15869.2 (83.67)	9341 (53.29)	32104.7 (81.32)	16088.2 (84.59)
4. Dividends	1750 (11.37)	2228.4 (8.63)	1667.7 (8.79)	1972 (11.25)	3592.4 (9.10)	1417.2 (7.45)
5. Capital gains	202 (1.31)	93.5 (0.36)	28.6 (0.15)	363 (0.07)	219.1 (0.55)	87.4 (0.46)
6. Others	2209 (14.36)	859.8 (3.33)	631.4 (3.33)	3433 (19.59)	2171.3 (5.50)	686.9 (3.61)
TOTAL	15386 (100.00)	25817.6 (100.00)	18967.4 (100.00)	17528 (100.00)	39479.6 (100.00)	19018.2 (100.00)

Notes: 1) Figures in parenthesis are percentages to total.

Source: Government of India,  
Ministry of Finance.  
"All India Income Tax Statistics."

contd TABLE - II.2

Source of Income	1971-72		1975-76	
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)
				Tax Yield (Rs. lakh)
1. Interest on securities	1030 (5.22)	1785.4 (1.45)	536 (3.21)	1544.2 (1.73)
2. Property income	1412 (7.16)	1346.3 (1.09)	985 (5.90)	623.3 (0.70)
3. Business and professions	11631 (58.97)	109058.9 (88.59)	11362 (68.05)	80324.8 (89.99)
4. Dividends	1639 (8.37)	5314.5 (4.32)	1018 (6.10)	3293.8 (3.69)
5. Capital gains	880 (4.46)	1490.2 (1.21)	572 (3.43)	1102.8 (1.24)
6. Others	3130 (15.87)	4115.3 (3.34)	2223 (13.31)	2373.9 (2.66)
TOTAL	19722 (100.00)	123110.6 (100.00)	16696 (100.00)	89262.8 (100.00)
				52375.3 (100.00)

TABLE II.3

## Assessees, Assessed Income and Tax Yield of Companies: Industry-wise Break-up

Industry group	1960-61			1965-66		
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)
1. Forestry, mining and quarrying	229 (2.77)	774.9 (3.59)	56.8 (0.36)	233 (2.50)	608.9 (1.89)	315.3 (1.96)
2. Primary industries (manufacture of food stuffs and beverages)	722 (8.72)	2520.6 (11.67)	1867.0 (11.76)	631 (6.76)	2953.3 (9.20)	1497.3 (9.31)
3. Textiles and leather	508 (6.14)	2612.9 (12.10)	1901.5 (11.98)	570 (6.11)	5019.6 (15.63)	2410.3 (14.98)
4. Metals and chemicals and their products	1169 (14.12)	4594.5 (21.27)	3495.7 (22.03)	1498 (16.05)	7883.9 (24.55)	3956.8 (21.59)
5. Cement, rubber and paper	676 (8.16)	1760.0 (8.15)	1306.8 (8.23)	866 (9.28)	3080.4 (9.60)	1431.3 (8.90)
6. Construction and utilities	317 (3.83)	763.8 (3.54)	579.6 (3.66)	287 (3.08)	1263.8 (3.94)	632.5 (3.93)
7. Commerce transport and communication	2885 (34.84)	4713.6 (21.84)	3616.2 (22.79)	3842 (41.07)	6989.7 (21.77)	3628.5 (22.55)
8. Finance	1419 (17.14)	3539.3 (16.38)	2304.2 (17.74)	1123 (12.04)	3967.6 (12.36)	2051.2 (12.75)
9. Professions	355 (4.29)	316.4 (1.46)	230.5 (1.45)	291 (3.12)	337.5 (1.05)	165.0 (1.03)
TOTAL	8280 (100.00)	21596.0 (100.00)	15869.2 (100.00)	9341 (100.00)	32104.7 (100.00)	16088.2 (100.00)

Note: 1. Relates to income of companies from business and professions. Source: Same as Table II.2

2. Figures in parenthesis are percentages to total.

Contd. Table - II.3

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Industry group	1971-72			1975-76		
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)
1. Forestry, mining & quarrying	302 (2.60)	2177.0 (2.00)	1213.1 (1.95)	197 (1.73)	1080.4 (1.35)	642.7 (1.37)
2. Primary industries (manufacture of food stuffs and beverages)	861 (7.40)	11259.9 (10.32)	6365.0 (10.25)	726 (6.39)	8176.6 (10.18)	4796.3 (10.20)
3. Textiles & leather	721 (6.20)	11691.4 (10.72)	6496.3 (10.46)	683 (6.01)	8162.7 (10.16)	4735.5 (10.07)
4. Metals & chemicals & their products	2470 (21.24)	30086.0 (27.59)	17034.9 (27.44)	2298 (20.23)	31015.1 (38.61)	18275.2 (38.85)
5. Cement, rubber & paper	1211 (10.41)	13221.2 (12.12)	7250.3 (11.68)	1239 (10.90)	9024.7 (11.24)	5427.5 (11.54)
6. Construction & utilities	319 (2.74)	2976.4 (2.73)	1780.1 (2.87)	228 (2.01)	1101.9 (1.37)	643.4 (1.37)
7. Commerce transport & communication	4102 (35.27)	18619.6 (17.07)	11369.9 (18.32)	4212 (37.07)	10606.5 (13.20)	6694.8 (14.23)
8. Finance	1158 (9.96)	18341.8 (16.82)	10160.6 (16.37)	1217 (10.71)	10313.5 (12.84)	5332.8 (11.34)
9. Professions	487 (4.19)	685.6 (0.63)	408.6 (0.66)	562 (4.99)	842.6 (1.05)	484.3 (1.03)
TOTAL	11631 (100.00)	109058.0 (100.00)	62078.8 (100.00)	11362 (100.00)	80324.8 (100.00)	47032.5 (100.00)

TABLE II.4

Size wise Distribution of Assessed Corporate Income and Tax Yield

Income Class (Rs.)	1960-61			1965-66		
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax yield (Rs. lakh)
1. 0 - 25000	4419 (53.37)	606.9 (2.81)	429.0 (2.70)	4567 (48.89)	561.4 (1.75)	289.1 (1.80)
2. 25001 - 50000	1019 (12.31)	387.5 (1.79)	285.2 (1.80)	1135 (12.15)	406.6 (1.27)	206.0 (1.28)
3. 50001 - 100000	864 (10.43)	652.7 (3.03)	489.3 (3.08)	1093 (11.70)	752.3 (2.34)	388.6 (2.42)
4. 100001 and above	1978 (23.89)	19948.9 (92.37)	14665.7 (92.42)	2546 (27.26)	30384.5 (94.64)	15204.5 (94.51)
TOTAL	8280 (100.00)	21596.0 (100.00)	15869.2 (100.00)	9341 (100.00)	32104.8 (100.00)	16088.2 (100.00)

Notes: 1. Data relate to corporate income from business and professions only

2. Figures in parenthesis are percentage to total.

Source: Same as Table II.2.

contd: TABLE II.4

Income Class (Rs.)	1971-72			1975-76		
	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax Yield (Rs. lakh)	Number of companies	Assessed income (Rs. lakh)	Tax Yield (Rs. lakh)
1. 0 - 25000	4559 (39.20)	655.5 (0.60)	398.9 (0.64)	5130 (45.15)	620.2 (0.77)	369.7 (0.79)
2. 25001 - 50000	1363 (11.72)	559.8 (0.51)	333.1 (0.54)	1390 (12.23)	545.2 (0.68)	344.7 (0.73)
3. 50001 - 100000	1314 (11.29)	1002.1 (0.92)	590.5 (0.95)	1338 (11.78)	1039.6 (1.29)	650.9 (1.38)
4. 100001 - and above	4395 (37.79)	106841.5 (97.97)	60756.3 (97.87)	3504 (30.84)	78119.8 (97.25)	45667.2 (97.10)
TOTAL	11631 (100.00)	109059.9 (100.00)	62078.8 (100.00)	11362 (100.00)	80324.8 (100.00)	47032.6 (100.00)

Gini Coefficients

	Assessed corporate income	Corporate tax yield
1960-61	0.745	0.745
1965-66	0.730	0.730
1971-72	0.784	0.782
1975-76	0.835	0.832

Notes: 1. 1/ With respect to number of  
corporate assessees.

2. Based on data in TABLE II.4

TABLE II.6

Pending Assessments  
(as on March 31)

	<u>P e n d i n g   f o r</u>					<u>Total</u>
	<u>1 year</u>	<u>2 years</u>	<u>3 years</u>	<u>4 years</u>	<u>5 years</u>	
1975	17314 (60.89)	7681 (27.01)	731 (2.57)	592 (2.08)	2120 (7.45)	28438 (100.0) <sup>2/</sup> (10.84)
1974	15646 (60.98)	6824 (26.60)	844 (3.29)	393 (1.53)	1950 (7.60)	25657 (100.0) <sup>3/</sup> (24.65)
1973	12366 (60.08)	5820 (28.42)	282 (1.37)	284 (1.38)	1802 (8.75)	20584 (100.0)
Average 1973 to 1975	15109 (60.70)	6785 (27.26)	619 (2.48)	423 (1.70)	1957 (7.86)	24893 (100.0)

Note: 1. Figures in parenthesis are percentages to total

2. Annual growth rate between 31.3.1973 and 31.3.1974

3. Annual growth rate between 31.3.1974 and 31.3.1975.

Source : Annual Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Union Government (Civil) Revenue Receipts Vol II : Direct Taxes.

Trends in Corporate Profits Tax Revenue

Year	Budget estimates	Revised estimates	Actual revenue
	(Rs. Crore)		
1960-61	135.0	137.5	111.1
1961-62	141.0	160.0	156.5
1962-63	168.0	187.5	221.5
1963-64	196.0	275.0	274.6
1964-65	295.0	342.0	314.1
(Period I)			
1960-61 to 1964-65	(20.8)	(26.7)	(30.2)
1965-66	386.0	330.0	304.8
1966-67	372.0	345.0	328.9
1967-68	350.0	319.7	310.3
1968-69	320.4	322.0	299.8
1969-70	326.2	320.0	353.4
(Period II)			
1965-66 to 1969-70	(-4.7)	(-1.3)	(2.1)
1970-71	342.0	365.0	370.5
1971-72	395.0	442.0	472.1
1972-73	493.5	558.0	557.8
1973-74	608.0	627.0	582.6
1974-75	661.0	713.0	709.5
(Period III)			
1970-71 to 1974-75	(19.1)	(18.3)	(16.3)
1975-76	780.5	954.0	861.7
1976-77	1025.0	1113.0	- 969.21
1977-78	1298.2	-	-
1960-61 to 1974-75	(12.0)	(11.5)	(11.1)

Notes: 1/ 1976-77 and 1977-78 revised and budget estimates respectively.

- Not available

Figures in parenthesis are average annual growth rates for the respective periods.

- Sources: 1. Annual Budgets of Central Government  
2. All India Income Tax Statistics

Contd. TABLE - III. 1

(Rs. Crore)				
Year	Budget estimates of additional revenue	Additional revenue adjusted to actuals	Revenue adjusted for estimation of elasticity	Revenue as given in income tax statistics
1960-61	0.0	0.0	111.1	122.0
1961-62	1.0	1.1	155.3	195.9
1962-63	10.4	13.8	206.2	175.1
1963-64	25.0	36.4	221.7	136.1
1964-65	1.7	1.8	252.2	179.1
(Period I)				
1960-61 to 1964-65	-	-	(22.1)	(4.1)
1965-66	-14.4	-11.4	253.9	186.6
1966-67	32.0	28.3	250.4	274.9
1967-68	0.0	0.0	236.3	301.1
1968-69	-4.0	-3.7	231.1	319.3
1969-70	-3.8	-4.1	275.5	301.9
(Period II)				
1965-66 to 1969-70	-	-	(0.8)	(11.7)
1970-71	0.0	0.0	288.9	-
1971-72	23.5	28.1	346.1	648.2
1972-73	13.5	15.3	397.9	387.7
1973-74	11.0	10.5	408.0	-
1974-75	0.0	0.0	496.9	409.2
(Period III)				
1970-71 to 1974-75	-	-	(13.3)	-
1975-76 <sub>1</sub>	10.5	11.6	554.7	496.0
1976-77 <sub>1</sub>	-	-	-	-
1977-78 <sub>1</sub>	-	-	-	-
1960-61 to 1974-75	-	-	(8.1)	(10.4)



TABLE III.3

Selected Accounts Data  
(1965-66 to 1969-70)

Year	Gross fixed assets		Value of production		Profits before tax		Sales net of excise	
	Per company (Rs. lakh)	Growth rate (%)						
1965-66	209.40	18.7	278.41	16.1	22.21	11.2	271.89	10.3
1966-67	238.13	13.7	310.26	11.4	23.24	4.6	304.11	11.1
1967-68	259.62	9.0	332.47	7.2	19.99	0.1	328.53	8.0
1968-69	279.15	7.5	359.98	8.3	20.33	1.7	356.61	8.5
1969-70	299.64	7.3	401.08	11.4	26.48	30.3	396.41	11.1

Source: RBI Bulletins: Studies on Finances of public limited companies.

TABLE III.4

Average Annual Growth Rates

	1960-61 to 1964-65	1965-66 to 1969-70	1970-71 to 1974-75	Overall growth rate 1960-61 to 1974-75
1. National income	11.20	10.80	14.62	11.26
2. Income from mining, manufacturing and transport, trade sector	9.13	10.32	13.97	11.42
3. Profits and dividends <sup>1/</sup>	11.74	1.88	14.68	7.08
4. Profits and dividends <sup>1/</sup>	12.33	0.97	15.70	6.97
<u>Per Company</u>				
5. Gross fixed assets	9.97	9.15	9.32	9.62
6. Net sales	9.24	9.56	9.72	9.32
7. Total assets	8.70	8.09	8.16	8.12
8. Profits before tax	8.97	4.65	7.21	5.02
9. Tax	15.80	-0.19	2.46	0.59
10. Profits after tax	2.97	-0.19	8.98	7.80
11. Value of production	9.72	9.18	10.04	9.20

<sup>1/</sup> Excluding profits and dividends from agriculture and allied sector as well as community and personnel services sector.

Source: (1) CSO: National Accounts Statistics. (2) RBI Bulletins: Studies on Finances of public limited companies.

TABLE III.5

Year to Year Elasticities

Years/Period	Elasticity coefficient
1960-61	-
1961-62	5.00
1962-63	3.99
1963-64	0.52
1964-65	0.81
1960-61 to 1964-65	2.58
1965-66	0.16
1966-67 ↓	-0.10
1967-68	-0.41
1968-69	-0.82
1969-70	1.67
1965-66 to 1969-70	0.10
1970-71	0.53
1971-72	2.76
1972-73	1.50
1973-74	0.13
1974-75	1.14
1970-71 to 1974-75	1.21
1960-61 to 1974-75	1.21

Note: The following formula is used to calculate the year to year elasticities:

$$\frac{\Delta X}{X} \cdot \frac{Y}{X}$$

Source: C.S.O: National Accounts Statistics for national income.

R.B.I Bulletins: Studies on finances of public limited companies.

TABLE - III.6

Elasticity and Buoyancy of the Corporate Profits Tax: Alternative Bases

Independent Variable/ Dependent Variable	Corporate Tax Revenue ( Accounts )					
	Elasticity			Buoyancy		
	$\beta$	R <sup>2</sup>	t( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	R <sup>2</sup>	t ( $\beta$ )
1. GNP (F)	0.7405	0.8322	8.0306	0.9817	0.8640	9.1236
2. GNP (M)	0.7387	0.8428	8.3478	0.9612	0.8667	9.1927
3. GDP (F) <sup>1/</sup>	0.7510	0.8365	8.1546	0.9777	0.8612	8.9800
4. GDP (M)	0.7385	0.8427	8.3454	0.9611	0.8668	9.1977
5. NNP (F) <sup>1/</sup>	0.7513	0.8349	8.1075	0.9009	0.8442	2.8124
6. NNP (M)	0.7381	0.8417	8.3139	0.9607	0.8659	9.1620
7. NDP (F) <sup>1/</sup>	0.7510	0.8348	8.1065	0.9781	0.8599	8.9337
8. NDP (M)	0.7380	0.8416	8.3117	0.9606	0.8660	9.1675
9. GDP <sup>2/</sup>	0.7458	0.8591	8.9035	0.9628	0.8795	9.7392
10. NDP <sup>2/</sup>	0.6848	0.8048	7.3210	0.8858	0.8179	7.6417

1/ Period covered is 1960-61 to 1975-76

2/ Income from agriculture and allied sector as well as from community and personnel services sector excluded

(M) and (F) refer to market value and factor cost, respectively.

Source: 1. C.S.O : National Accounts Statistics

2. Budgets of Central Government.

TABLE III.7

Buoyancy Coefficients: Disaggregated Results

	Indian Public companies		Indian Private limited companies		Foreign companies	
	I	II	I	II	I	II
Tax to NNP	0.73	0.72	-0.01 <sup>1/</sup>	-0.01	0.48 <sup>1/</sup>	0.50
Tax to GVA	0.81	0.82	0.60 <sup>1/</sup>	-0.05	0.77	0.75

I. By regression method

II. By growth rate method

1960-61 to 1974-75 for Public and Private limited Indian companies and 1960-61 to 1972-73 for foreign companies

<sup>1/</sup>: Statistically not significant

NNP : Net national product at market prices

GVA : Gross value added

Tax : Corporate profits tax provision

~~NA : Data not available~~